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155 
THE COURSE FORWARD FOR ARCTIC 
GOVERNANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Arctic region has been undergoing unprecedented and disruptive 
change over the last several decades. These changes are taking place on at 
least three interrelated fronts, the first of which is environmental: 
primarily, global climate change.1 Stated bluntly, the Arctic is warming 
twice as fast as the rest of the world and human activity in the area is 
creating other environmental challenges such as increased pollution and 
changes to native ecosystems.2  
Second, there has been a massive economic transformation of the 
Arctic in recent years.3 Investment in the Arctic may reach over $100 
billion over the next decade as countries and industries take advantage of 
record commodity prices to search and extract oil, natural gas, and other 
resources.4 The Arctic is also becoming more accessible to trading vessels 
 
 
 1. For an introduction to the environmental changes affecting the Arctic since at least the 
1950’s, see James Astill, The Melting North, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), http://www.economist 
.com/node/21556798. For scholarly treatment of the scientific processes happening in the Arctic in 
particular, see Henry Huntington & Gunter Weller et al., An Introduction to the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1, 10–17 (2005), available at http://www.acia 
.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html [hereinafter ACIA]. The ACIA was completed at the behest of the Arctic 
Council, and included dozens of scientists and academics from Arctic Countries. See also NAT’L 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, ARCTIC REPORT CARD (2012), available at 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/ [hereinafter 2012 ARCTIC REPORT CARD]. For a recent report 
on climate issues from a worldwide perspective, see M.O. Jeffries and J. Richter-Menge, State of the 
Climate in 2012, 94 BULL. AMER. METEOR. SOC., no. 8, Supp. Aug. 2013, at S111–S146, available at 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/bams-state-of-the-climate/2012.php.   
 2. See V.E. Romanovsky et al., Permafrost, in 2012 ARCTIC REPORT CARD, supra note 1, at 
159. The Arctic Report Card is an annual, peer-reviewed publication detailing many of the recent 
climate and environmental challenges facing the Arctic Region. It is published by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, an office of the Department of Commerce. See also 
Magdalena A.K. Muir, Hydrocarbon Development and Maritime Shipping for the Circumpolar Arctic 
in the Context of the Arctic Council and Climate Change, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 38 (Spring 
2008). 
 3. For an overview of the economic and investment changes occurring in the Arctic region, see 
CHARLES EMERSON & GLADA LAHN, LLOYD’S, ARCTIC OPENING: OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN THE 
HIGH NORTH 18–34 (2012), available at http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/News%20and%20 
Insight/360%20Risk%20Insight/Arctic_Risk_Report_20120412.pdf; see also Muir, supra note 2.  
 4. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 6. As this study and others note, the uncertainties going 
forward with regard to climate change, regulatory schemes, and political developments mean that this 
number could go significantly up or significantly down. The majority of this money will go toward the 
exploration and extraction of oil, natural gas, precious minerals, iron, zinc, and other natural resources, 
along with the requisite infrastructure to transport these materials. Other industries supporting those 
endeavors will also be recipients of direct investment as well. Such industries may include housing, 
local fisheries, scientific research, etc. Id. 
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as the ice melts and icebreaking technology on ships improves.5 These 
changes will bring fabled routes such as the “Northwest Passage” into 
existence, potentially revolutionizing worldwide shipping by cutting 
thousands of miles off current routes.6  
The third major category of change includes the social transformations 
sweeping Arctic communities.7 These changes encompass both progress 
and challenges for those who call the Arctic home.8 Declines in traditional 
modes of employment, increased outward migration, and economic 
inequality point to challenges.9 At the same time, there are signs of 
positive social changes as money comes into the region.10 These new 
sources of income are contributing to important advances in local 
education, health care, and transportation infrastructure.11  
Therefore, because of the effects of global warming in the Arctic, the 
Arctic’s impact upon global climate, and the increasing interconnectedness 
of the Arctic to the rest of the world via globalization, it “is clear that the 
Arctic cannot go its own way, carving out a developmental path 
independent of global forces.”12 Instead, the future of the Arctic must be 
discussed in a global context, and the successful governance of the region 
must be a topic of worldwide importance. 
 
 
 5. For an overview of the changing nature of Arctic shipping in the Arctic region, as well as 
transportation and relevant infrastructure development, see H. Edwin Anderson, III, Polar Shipping, 
The Forthcoming Polar Code and Implications for the Polar Environments, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59 
(2012). See also infra Part I.C. 
 6. Tourism is another example of increased investment in the Arctic region, encompassing both 
maritime cruise shipping and land-based tourism. See Laurence C. Smith, Unfreezing Arctic Assets, 
WALL ST. J. Sept. 18, 2010, at W1.  
 7. For treatment of some of the most important social changes and dynamics taking place in the 
Arctic region, see Conference Report, Nordic Council of Ministers, Common Concern for the Arctic 
(Sept. 9–10, 2008), http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2008-750/at_download/ 
publicationfile [hereinafter Nordic Report]. See also John Crump, Snow, Sand, Ice, and Sun: Climate 
Change and Equity in the Arctic and Small island Developing States, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 8 (Spring 2008). 
 8. Some of the challenges facing the Arctic are similar to challenges of developing areas 
anywhere in a globalizing world. For those left behind, the question is where the jobs of the future will 
come from. Nordic Report, supra note 7, at 60–64.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Economic development is bringing significant investment in infrastructure and transfer 
payments of royalties for the rights to extract mineral resources. Id. 
 11. Id. There is even a relatively new “University of the Arctic.” This university, which does not 
have a physical campus, is a network of universities, colleges, and research institutes in the extreme 
North that seeks to foster cohesion among northern peoples by building regional identity, improving 
access to education, and concentrating on issues affecting the Arctic Region. About UArctic, 
UNIVERSITY OF THE ARCTIC,  http://www.uarctic.org/default.aspx?m=6 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 12. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT, ARCTIC GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF TRANSFORMATIVE 
CHANGE: CRITICAL QUESTIONS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, WAYS FORWARD (2010), available at 
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/.  
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In Part I, this Note will discuss the climatic, economic, and social 
changes that have been taking place over the last several decades in the 
Arctic. Part II will discuss the current governance framework.13 Part III 
will discuss the economic, social, and political goals that should inform 
changes in Arctic governance. It also will argue that economic 
development of the Arctic region can be and must be consistent with 
rigorous environmental protections. Part IV will discuss specific 
recommendations and potential improvements to a comprehensive 
framework for the future. 
The scope of this subject is so vast and complex that it cannot be dealt 
with exhaustively within the space available here. Therefore, the goal of 
this Note is to argue for the need to think comprehensively about Arctic 
governance, to suggest goals for Arctic governance, and to establish the 
parameters within which this conversation should take place. 
I. THE CHANGING ARCTIC 
A. Defining the Arctic 
The Arctic is a vast region, richly diverse in ecology, weather, animal 
life, and the extent of human impact.14 Thus, it is important to have a 
working definition of the geographic area discussed in this Note. This 
Note uses a broad definition of the Arctic, corresponding closely to that 
used by the Arctic states themselves.15 This encompasses land and sea 
areas north of 60 degrees for the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland, and the whole of Greenland and Iceland. So defined, 
 
 
 13. For an overview of some of the governance issues, topics, proposals, and analysis, see id. See 
also Clive Schofield et al., Boundaries, Biodiversity, Resources, and Increasing Maritime Activities: 
Emerging Oceans Governance Challenges For Canada In The Arctic, 34 VT. L. REV. 35 (2009); TIMO 
KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC (2010), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ 
3in1_final.pdf. 
 14. Sometimes the “Arctic” denotes both land and sea north of the Arctic Circle (66 degrees, 
North), though Arctic countries themselves often generally define Arctic areas as being north of 60 
degrees. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC BOUNDARIES, available at http://www.arctic-council.org/images/ 
maps/boundaries.pdf. Another possible definition is that used by the ACIA: “The Arctic is a single, 
highly integrated system comprised of a deep, ice covered, and nearly isolated ocean surrounded by 
the land masses of Eurasia and North America, except for breaches at the Bering Strait and in the 
North Atlantic.” Huntington & Weller et al., supra note 1, at 10. Approximately two-thirds of the 
Arctic is ocean. Id. at 12. 
 15. For example, Congress has defined the Arctic as “all United States and foreign territory north 
of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the 
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the 
Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.” 15 U.S.C. § 4111 (2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Arctic encompasses over one sixth of the world’s landmass: thirty 
million square kilometers.16 Despite its grand size, the Arctic has been 
sparsely populated throughout human history. Presently, approximately 
four million people call the Arctic home.17 
B. Environmental Changes 
The environmental changes affecting the Arctic encompass several 
broad categories. The most important of these is global climate change, 
though increased pollution from natural resource developers, shipping, and 
tourism also represent challenges to the Arctic region. 
1. Global Climate Change 
The Arctic region is feeling the effects of global climate change more 
severely and more quickly than almost anywhere else on earth—the 
“Arctic Amplification”—because of various complex and interrelated 
phenomena.18 Since 1951, the Arctic has warmed twice as fast as the rest 
of the world, as average temperatures have increased by 1.5 degrees 
Celsius,19 while global average increases have been 0.7 degrees.20 The 
extreme North is even experiencing the effects of climate change more 
quickly than the Antarctic.21 
 
 
 16. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP (2010), available at www.arctic 
-council.org/eppr/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Arctic-Council-fact-sheet.pdf. For a discussion of the 
Arctic Council’s description of the Arctic region, see About the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 
9, 2013), http://www.arctic-council.org/article/about. 
 17. ARCTIC COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 16. See also Huntington & Weller et 
al., supra note 1, at 13. These numbers mark the apogee of human involvement with the Arctic. 
Although humans have been present in the Arctic since at least the last ice age, the twentieth century 
has seen dramatic increases in immigration to the Arctic. Today, non-indigenous persons outnumber 
indigenous ones in many regions, drawn by many of the economic changes that have been sweeping 
the region. Id.  
 18. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 11. 
 19. Astill, supra note 1. It is important to note that different areas within the Arctic may have 
experienced somewhat less or somewhat more warming, and certain methods of measuring may give 
different impressions of the scale of the warming. For instance, according to the ACIA, between 1954 
and 2003, the mean annual surface air temperature rose by two to three degrees Celsius in Alaska and 
Siberia, thus almost doubling the rate of warming felt by the Arctic as a whole. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, 
IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 23 (2004), available at 
http://www.amap.no/documents/download/1058.  
 20. Astill, supra note 1. 
 21. See generally John Turner & Jim Overland, Contrasting Climate Change in the Two Polar 
Regions, 28 POLAR RES. 146 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ j.1751-
8369.2009.00128.x/pdf. “The two polar regions have experienced remarkably different climatic 
changes in recent decades. The Arctic has seen a marked reduction in sea-ice extent throughout the 
year, with a peak during the autumn. . . . In contrast, the extent of Antarctic sea ice has increased, with 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/9
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Much of Arctic Amplification is attributable to atmospheric mixing, 
whereby warm air from the equators moves to the poles.22 There is more 
atmospheric mixing in the northern hemisphere than the southern 
hemisphere, and the movement of moisture and warm water currents from 
the equator amplifies this trend.23  
Reductions in sea ice and snow cover are another important factor in 
Arctic Amplification. As the region becomes less white, it absorbs more 
heat instead of reflecting it.24 Thus, there is some level of consensus that 
the Arctic region is especially vulnerable to climate change.25 This is 
significant because the Arctic in turn has a unique impact upon global 
climate change in the rest of the world, including the possibility of rising 
sea levels as Arctic glaciers melt.26  Therefore, the various climate 
phenomena occurring in the Arctic “will affect the Earth’s climate system 
as a whole.”27  
 
 
the greatest growth being in the autumn.” Id. at 146. While “[t]here has been large-scale warming 
across much of the Arctic, with a resultant loss of permafrost and a reduction in snow cover. . . . [t]he 
bulk of the Antarctic has experienced little change in surface temperature over the last 50 years.” Id. 
See infra note 22 and accompanying text for an explanation of the physical processes by which this 
“Arctic Amplification” takes place. 
 22. Part of this is explained by geography. While in both hemispheres the atmosphere moves heat 
from the equator to the poles, this process is much more efficient in the northern hemisphere. Astill, 
supra note 1. Factors include the large mountain ranges in the northern hemisphere in America, 
Europe, and Asia “that help mix warm and cold fronts, much as boulders churn water in a stream.” Id. 
Antarctica, which is surrounded by ocean for hundreds of miles, experiences much less atmospheric 
mixing. Id. 
 23. Id.  
The land masses that encircle the Arctic also prevent the polar oceans [from] revolving 
around it as they do in Antarctica. Instead they surge, north-south, between the Arctic land 
masses in a gigantic exchange of cold and warm water: the Pacific pours through the Bering 
Strait, between Siberia and Alaska, and the Atlantic through the Fram Strait, between 
Greenland and Norway’s Svalbard archipelago. That keeps the average annual temperature 
for the high Arctic (the northernmost fringes of land and the sea beyond) at . . . -15°C. . . . 
The Antarctic . . . [has] an average annual temperature of -57° C.  
Id. 
 24. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 11. 
 25. This view is seconded by the 2005 ACIA, supra note 1, which “predicted that the Arctic will 
feel the effects of climate change sooner and more severely than other regions of the earth.” Crump, 
supra note 7, at 8.  
 26. Gunter Weller et al., Summary and Synthesis of the ACIA, in ACIA, supra note 1, at 989, 990. 
“Changes in climate and UV radiation in the Arctic will not only have far-reaching consequences for 
the arctic environment and its peoples, but will also affect the rest of the world, including the global 
climate. The connections include arctic sources of change affecting the globe, e.g., feedback processes 
affecting the global climate, sea-level rise resulting from the melting of arctic glaciers and ice sheets, 
and arctic-triggered changes in the global thermohaline circulation of the ocean.” Id. 
 27. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 12, at 2. 
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2. Other Environmental Challenges 
Pollution generated from increased human activity in the Arctic is 
another major environmental concern.28 For example, natural seeps in 
pipelines and oil rigs are a major source of petroleum hydrocarbon 
contamination in the Arctic environment.29 Another source of pollution is 
the increasing number of ships operating in the area.30 In this context, the 
most prevalent problems are bunker spills and exhaust emissions.31 
Indeed, these are likely the biggest risks apart from major spills.32  
In addition to the activity of human beings within the Arctic itself, 
there are sources of pollution from outside the region that impact the 
Arctic environment. The most important of these includes soot from the 
emissions of coal-burning power plants, which migrates toward the poles, 
increasing the absorption of heat in the atmosphere.33  
Arguably, however, the most visible and potentially devastating 
environmental concern hanging over Arctic activities is the potential for a 
repeat of the Exxon-Valdez incident. Such incidents would be even more 
dangerous in the Arctic context because of the unique ecosystem, remote 
location, and harsh conditions.34 
All of these events impact local ecosystems, potentially causing more 
concern. This challenge is illustrated by recent trends in Arctic fisheries, 
which have both environmental and social implications.35 For example, as 
 
 
 28. Muir, supra note 2, at 38–39.  
 29. Id. 
 30. See Anderson, supra note 5. For treatment of the economic phenomenon surrounding 
increased shipping in the Arctic, see infra Part I.C.3. 
 31. Id. at 74. 
 32. Id. 
 33. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 38. More specifically, black carbon, which are small 
particles of pollution resulting from the burning of fossil fuels, migrates toward the Arctic region while 
in the atmosphere. This black carbon absorbs additional ultraviolet radiation and is associated with 
Arctic warming. Id. Another migratory pollutant is airborne mercury. Approximately 100 tons of this 
substance is deposited in the Arctic Ocean annually from industrial sources not located in the Arctic 
region. Id.  
 34. Indeed, the Exxon Valdez incident, which spilled between 257,000 and 700,000 gallons of 
oil, was one of the most devastating environmental disasters in this country’s history. Others, however, 
including the sinking of the Selendang Ayu in 2004, spilled over 360,000 gallons of oil. Beyond the 
environmental impact, however, the accident also cost the company over $112 million. Anderson, 
supra note 5, at 65. 
 35. For a fuller discussion of this latter point, see Jennifer Jeffers, Climate Change and the 
Arctic: Adapting to Changes in Fisheries Stocks and Governance Regimes, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 917, 
958–59 (2010). In general, global climate change may dramatically affect fish populations in the 
Arctic. This is because fish generally have a very narrow temperature within which they thrive. This is 
turn is because fish are ectotherms, meaning that their body temperature is dictated by the surrounding 
waters, and thermal levels outside of their narrow range are less than optimal. Frederick J. Wrona et 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/9
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global temperatures rise, ice melts, and salt content decreases. As a result, 
some native fish are unable to find suitable food. Also, foreign species 
from lower latitudes are moving north, competing for food.36 This in turn 
causes ripple effects throughout the food chain as larger animals find it 
more difficult to hunt, or change their diets.37 This is an especially 
pressing concern in areas where the indigenous populations may live in 
reliance upon local fishing grounds.38  
C. Economic Developments 
Global climate change and economic development in the region affect 
each other in a synergistic fashion.39 The combined effects of high global 
prices for hydrocarbons, melting ice, and technological progress mean that 
the natural resource base of the Arctic is now increasingly significant and 
commercially viable.40 
1. Natural Resource Development 
The Arctic has potentially huge amounts of oil and natural gas.41 
Countries like Norway have begun handing out hydrocarbon exploration 
 
 
al., Freshwater Ecosystems and Fisheries, in ACIA, supra note 1, at 353, 394. The same principle 
holds true for the smaller fish that are food for bigger fish. Thus, if a small temperature or other 
ecosystem change forced a particular species from an area, and that species was a food source for 
larger fish and so on, large scale migrations in fish populations would follow. Id. at 418. Indeed, this is 
what the ACIA predicts. Warming temperatures will allow for the northerly migration of some species 
of fish, displacing native species, while some species could lose their food sources altogether. Id.
Therefore, the effects of warming in the Arctic will be uneven. In the case of some important 
commercial species of fish, including Atlantic Cod, Herring, and Pollack, moderate warming will be 
very beneficial. It will expand their natural breeding grounds, as they generally thrive in warmer 
waters. Id. Other, more northerly fish, however, will see increased competition for food and resources. 
Id. 
 36. Another great illustration of this point concerns the copepod Calanus glacialis. This creature 
is only about 4mm long, but most animals in the Arctic depend upon it at some point in the food chain. 
James Astill, Pity The Copepod, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21556804. Cod, haddock, and other fish eat the copepod, and walruses and polar bears in turn eat the 
fish dependent on this crustacean. Id. C. glacialis feeds upon special algae on the edges of polar ice. 
This algae is appearing earlier in the year, at a time that conflicts with the copepod’s hibernation cycle. 
Id. It may thus miss out on this food. In any event, different copepods which are not as appropriately 
nutritious for larger animals are moving north, competing with C. glacialis. Id. This may disrupt some 
food supplies for Arctic animals higher up the food chain. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Jeffers, supra, note 35, at 960. 
 39. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 8. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF 
UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE (Peter H. Shauffer ed., 2008), available 
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
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licenses across the region.42 Much of this excitement has centered upon 
recent estimates from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), which 
reports that the Arctic may have up to 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.43 This would make the Arctic a significant 
addition to global reserves.44 
Hydrocarbons are not all that are at stake. The Arctic is rich in other 
minerals.45 One of the world’s largest “zinc mines is in Arctic Alaska, and 
the biggest nickel palladium mine is in the Russian Arctic.”46 Greenland is 
building a $2.5 billion iron-ore mine that would be worth more than the 
island’s GDP by itself.47 “Mining in the [Arctic] region is poised for 
growth, for much the same reasons as energy production: high commodity 
prices, improved technology, and keen Arctic governments” interested in 
 
 
 42. On January 17, 2012, Ola Borten Moe, Norway’s minister for oil and petroleum, awarded 
twenty-six production licenses for developed offshore oil areas in the Norwegian and Barents Sea. 
Quirin Schiermeier, The Great Arctic Oil Race Begins, NATURE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.nature 
.com/news/the-great-arctic-oil-race-begins-1.9932. The story in Norway is especially representative of 
the shift in future resource production toward the North. Whereas Norway has always been a major 
producer of petroleum products, most of that has been in the North Sea area, which is a non-Arctic 
area. Now, however, “the ‘new oil provinces’ are in the Arctic.” Id. Indeed, Statoil, the Norwegian oil 
and gas company, hopes to “extract one million barrels of oil equivalent a day from new wells in the 
Arctic.” Id.  
 43. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 19. These numbers represent approximately thirteen 
percent and thirty percent, respectively, of the world’s estimated undiscovered reserves, although the 
percentages were calculated before more recent discoveries of shale gas deposits were fully factored 
in. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 41. Thus, while the absolute numbers are the same, the 
Arctic’s percent of the known world reserves may be slightly lower. The study also estimated that 
there are 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids in the Arctic. Id. Natural gas liquids differ from 
natural gas as otherwise used in this Note because, as its name implies, it is a liquid. Natural gas, 
occurring in its natural state, is in a gaseous form. Id. 
 44. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 41. Importantly, however, some dissenters believe 
that the projections of the USGS are far too optimistic. According to a joint study by Wood Mackenzie 
and Fugro Roberson, the “Arctic potential is significantly less than previous estimations had 
suggested, and the mix of resources have been found to contain much less oil and more gas.” Press 
Release, Wood Mackenzie & Fugro Rogertson, Arctic Role Diminished in World Oil Supply (Nov. 1, 
2006) (available at http://www.woodmacresearch.com/cgi-bin/wmprod/portal/corp/corpPressDetail.jsp 
?oid=751298). The study found that there is “only approximately one quarter of the oil volumes 
previously assessed in key North American and Greenland basins. Most importantly, the study reveals 
the Arctic to be a gas province, with 85 percent of the discovered resource and 74 percent of the 
exploration potential as gas.” Id. If this study is accurate, then the ratio of natural gas to oil resources 
in the Arctic region will militate against large scale development in the near term “because remote gas 
is often much harder to transport to markets.” Id.  
 45. Attempts to exploit the mineral wealth of the region go back well over a century. Examples 
include “[t]he 1897–99 Klondike gold rush, in northern Canada, one degree outside the Arctic Circle” 
and “[t]he iron ore in Swedish Lapland [that] sustained Germany during the Second World War and 
helped to rebuild Europe after it.” James Astill, Hidden Treasure, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556800. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Outsiders in the Arctic, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2013, at 49. 
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economic growth.48 Thus, it is not difficult to see why many analysts 
believe that investment in the Arctic could reach $100 billion within the 
next ten years.49 
2. Infrastructure 
The documented increase in economic activity in the Arctic region is 
also leading to significant investment in infrastructure, mostly in the 
Arctic Ocean itself. Currently, “[t]he only big offshore Arctic production 
site is the Snohvit gas field in the Norwegian Barents Sea.”50 However, 
this is changing and current investment is of a widely diverse nature. 
“Private companies have snapped up Canada’s northernmost railroad and 
port . . . [and] $2.8 billion in offshore energy leases.”51 Russia is investing 
in port installations, new oil and coal terminals, and a railway head at 
Murmansk.52 Meanwhile, Norway shifted its military command center to 
the Arctic in 2009.53 In addition to investment because of future 
opportunities, some increase in infrastructure spending is required because 
melting permafrost is making existing roads and railways impassable 
during summer months.54  
 
 
 48. Astill, supra note 45.  
This is already obvious in the Canadian Arctic, where ArcelorMittal, a big steelmaker, and a 
partner paid $590 million for a large iron-ore deposit in 2011. But its effects may be most 
dramatic in Greenland, which has issued over 100 exploration permits to companies looking 
for metals and gemstones. High operating costs and harsh conditions will limit the rate of 
extraction, but Greenland will be mining lots of iron, uranium, gold, rare earths, diamonds 
and rubies before it gets an oil industry.  
Id.  
 49. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 6. This investment will be largely in the development of 
non-renewable natural resources, and in infrastructure construction and renewal. Id. at 9. 
 50. Astill, supra note 45. 
 51. Smith, supra note 6. 
 52. James Astill, Short and Sharp, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), http://www.economist.com 
node/21556803. 
 53. Astill, supra note 1.  
 54. Stated another way, climate change may, at least in the short term, create new vulnerabilities 
in current infrastructure as roads that used to be frozen year-round may now be slushy and impassable 
at times. Northern railways are vulnerable to thawing of the permafrost, which can cause the rack to 
buckle, leading to derailments. Repairs have already cost millions of dollars. EMERSON & LAHN, supra 
note 3, at 16. Future Arctic infrastructure will need to be able to adapt to much more diverse 
environmental and weather conditions, especially over the multi-decade lives of the infrastructure 
projects. Id. at 15.  
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3. Shipping 
Apart from the natural resources in which the Arctic is rich, 
opportunities to revolutionize shipping routes worldwide are presenting 
themselves in the face of the retreating ice.55 Consequently, the presence 
of “commercial vessels in the Arctic . . . is expected to grow exponentially 
over the next decades.”56   
The appeal of these routes is obvious: “The Northwest Passage offers a 
staggering 9,000 km (4,860 nautical miles (nm)) of distance saving over 
the traditional route between Europe and Asia via the Panama Canal 
. . . .”
57
 The Northern Sea Route (NSR), along the coast of Siberia, “cuts 
the distance between western Europe and east Asia by roughly a third.”58 
Voyages along the NSR are increasing rapidly,59 and it is thought that 
approximately 6000 vessels operate in the region during the shipping 
season.60 Potentially even more important is the impact of a longer 
shipping season as the Arctic warms. By some estimates, the length of the 
shipping season could eventually quadruple.61 In anticipation of this 
confluence of factors, some of the major shipping nations in the region are 
building up their icebreaking fleets.62 
 
 
 55. Various routes across the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR), long sought-after throughout history, are becoming a reality. Anderson, supra note 5. 
Such routes as these could dramatically shift, if not revolutionize, shipping lanes, because they offer 
quicker ways to get products to markets by cutting the distance between exporters of goods and their 
final consumers. Id. Other analysts suggest that development of Arctic shipping lanes will increase 
strategic security for Western nations by decreasing reliance on unstable potentially unsafe shipping 
lanes through the Suez Canal and in the Indian Ocean, especially around the Horn of Africa. Astill, 
supra note 52. 
 56. Anderson, supra note 5.  The growth will largely be in commercial vessels involved in the 
petroleum and mining industries in the Arctic. Id. The much larger percentage of worldwide shipping 
traffic (container shipping) will probably not be a major part of Arctic shipping for some time. Id. 
Beyond the natural resources extraction industry, shipping activity in the Arctic presently falls largely 
into only a few categories: (1) northern community supply; (2) fishing; (3) tourism; and (4) assorted 
research and coast guard vessels, usually operated by local governments. Id. at 62. 
 57. Schofield, supra note 13, at 41. The savings would be over 17,000km (9,180 nautical miles) 
when compared to the Cape Horn route. Id. 
 58. Astill, supra note 1. On the other hand, the Arctic routes are still dangerous, because only ten 
percent of Arctic waters are charted, and many ports are lacking in basic infrastructure. Anderson, 
supra note 5, at 64. 
 59. Astill, supra note 52. 
 60. Anderson, supra note 5, at 61. 
 61. See id. at 64. Currently, the shipping season along the NSR is 30 days. According to some 
projections, “during the next 100 years, the sailing season along the NSR will gradually increase from 
the current 30 days to over 120 days.” Id. Assuming that ice breaking technology improves this could 
increase to 170 days per shipping season. Id. 
 62. Astill, supra note 52. 
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4. Tourism 
Increases in tourism will be another economic development to watch in 
the coming decades.63 Both land-based tourism and cruise ships are 
booming as more parts of the Arctic become accessible for longer portions 
of the year due to the general warming trends.64 Between 2004 and 2007, 
the number of passengers traveling to the Arctic on cruise ships more than 
doubled.65 In 2008, “nearly 400 cruise-ships arrived in Greenland alone.”66 
Finally, although extraction, infrastructure, shipping, and tourism are 
the most visible economic phenomena currently taking place in the Arctic, 
other opportunities may soon make an impact. General scientific 
research,67 such as bio-pharmaceutical research, continues to evolve 
alongside these more traditional economic changes.68 
D. Social Changes  
The massive climatic and economic developments happening in the 
Arctic have had significant and complex social impacts on regional 
communities in both positive and negative ways.69  
On the positive side, investment in infrastructure, extraction, and 
transportation of mineral resources creates jobs and companies engaged in 
 
 
 63. In Greenland, for example, the number of booked hotel nights has increased from 179,349 in 
2002 to 236,913 in 2008. “In Longyearbyen, on Svalbard in Norway, these numbers rose from around 
30,000 in 1995 to over 89,000 in 2008 (before declining to 77,000 in 2010).” Tourists themselves have 
been coming from farther away as well. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 31. The story is similar 
for cruise ships in the area. There has been such an increase in cruise traffic that an Association of 
Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators has been set up to facilitate the sharing of best practices and for 
support of cruise lines. ASSOCIATION OF ARCTIC EXPEDITION CRUISE OPERATORS, http://www 
.aeco.no/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).  
 64. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 31.  
 65. Smith, supra note 6. 
 66. Id.  
 67. “The U.S. National Science Foundation spends nearly a half-billion dollars annually” on 
polar research, and NASA’s investments in the region may soon reach $2 billion as it develops new 
satellites to map the polar regions. Id.  
 68. For example, there is also interest in the living resources of the Arctic as a source of genetic 
information. The adaptive tendencies of Arctic species and their abilities to survive in extreme 
conditions evidently make the study of the creatures worthwhile, and could lead to medical 
breakthroughs. Schofield, supra note 13, at 39. 
 69. In 2008, several Arctic countries gathered at a conference organized by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers at Illulissat in Greenland, entitled “Common Concern for the Arctic,” in part to address some 
of these questions. See Nordic Report, supra note 7, at 62–66. Some of the challenges addressed 
included losses of traditional modes of employment, vast wealth disparities with the arrival of resource 
development, and a lack of assistance in helping locals transition to a modern economy. Id. Positive 
changes included investments in infrastructure, transportation, education and health, most of which 
comes from the royalties of the extractive industries. Id. 
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this development pay significant royalties to local property owners.70 
Thus, there has been an influx of money from sources as diverse as 
companies dealing in petroleum, precious minerals, and tourism. Direct 
royalties are also contributing to more broad-based economies with a 
growing service sector.71 Thus, wage work in administration, education, 
and social services is the main source of income for most Arctic families 
now, as this sector generates more than seventy percent of the economic 
activity and eighty percent of the jobs in this region.72 
On the other hand, a great deal of the money being made in the Arctic 
does not stay there, but instead benefits outsiders in the developed world.73 
It is also argued that the money that does stay in the Arctic results in 
“social stratification, inequity in wealth distribution, and perceived 
deprivation.”74 In some cases, economic development means demographic 
imbalances as the young move away in search of educational and job 
opportunities.75  
Amplifying this problem is the fact that the Arctic has always had a 
different economic and social system than much of the developed world. 
Renewable resources such as fisheries and hunting have been the 
economic basis for most northern communities for centuries.76 This leads 
to the criticism that Arctic communities are at a structural imbalance when 
dealing with the developed world: namely, that “the impacts of climate 
change are being felt by parts of the world that currently lack the resources 
to cope with the rapid change they are experiencing.”77 
 
 
 70. Id. at 62. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. This is especially true for women, contributing to a rising number of households that 
depend on the income generated by females. Id. 
 73. Id. at 19. 
 74. Id. at 61. 
 75. Some Arctic communities have only 6 or 7 women to every 10 men in younger cohorts. Id. at 
20. 
 76. Id. at 61. As with globalization elsewhere, worldwide competition in these industries has had 
a downward effect on prices, driving a concomitant increase in the scale of production, which in turn 
requires fewer workers. Id.   
 77. Crump, supra note 7, at 8. This point of view holds that the Arctic, as well as smaller, 
developing island states are “among the most vulnerable to climate change effects yet they have 
contributed least to global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.” Id. Some groups have taken more 
radical positions in their protestation of changes. One such position included a petition against human 
rights violations supposedly committed by the United States to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. In 2005, representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference petitioned the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights for help “in obtaining relief from human rights violations 
resulting from the impacts of global warming and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the 
United States.” Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the 
United States 1 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05. pdf. 
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Thus, those in the Arctic region have complex views of the recent 
changes. Some see the changes as challenges to traditional lifestyles, while 
others envision new opportunities that their previous lives could never 
have afforded.78  
II. THE CURRENT REGIME 
All of these changes in the Arctic have happened within a governance 
framework that is a patchwork of legal regimes.79 The first layer in the 
legal regime consists of the eight sovereign Arctic states operating through 
their domestic legal systems.80 The next layer includes binding and non-
binding multilateral and bilateral treaties, as well as customary 
international law.81 At the broadest level, though, the last few decades 
have seen a focus on the Arctic region as a whole. This focus is manifested 
 
 
The petition asserts that “the United States is obligated by its membership in the Organization of 
American states and its acceptance of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man to 
protect the rights of the Inuit.” Id.  The petition requests that the Commission “prepare a report setting 
forth all the facts and applicable law, declaring that the United States of America is internationally 
responsible for violations of rights.” Id. at 7. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
declined to hear the petition, but later held a hearing on the issue of global warming. Jessica Gordon, 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold Hearing After Rejecting Inuit Climate Change 
Petition, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 55 (Winter 2007). 
 78. Some of the challenges facing the Arctic are similar to challenges of developing areas 
anywhere in a globalizing world. For those left behind, the question is where the jobs of the future will 
come from. See Nordic Report, supra note 7, at 62–66. 
 79. Others have characterized it as a “hodgepodge” of international treaties, bilateral agreements, 
and domestic law. Bonnie A. Malloy, On Thin Ice: How A Binding Treaty Regime Can Save The 
Arctic, 16 HASTINGS W.–NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 471, 481 (2010). 
 80. Jeffers, supra note 35, at 923. Further complicating the issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction 
is the fact that several indigenous groups within Canada, Russia, and the United States have their own 
semi-autonomous governments. Id. While that is often a salient and politically important issue in the 
domestic politics of Arctic countries, it attracts less attention at an international level. Hence the 
discussion of indigenous status will be limited to those instances in which international law is affected, 
or indigenous groups have been incorporated into the governance mechanisms, such as the Arctic 
Council. Id. 
 81. One example includes the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The 
United States signed but has not ratified UNCLOS. See id.; see also Status of Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION ch. XXI, § 6, available 
at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx. However, the Illulissat Declaration, adopted 
by the five coastal states bordering on the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark, Norway, The Russian 
Federation, and the United States of America—implies that UNCLOS is binding law, and the United 
States accepts it as a matter of customary international law. Hans Corell, The Arctic: An Opportunity 
to Cooperate and Demonstrate Statesmanship, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1065, 1067–68 (2009). 
Other multilateral actors include the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is responsible 
for worldwide maritime safety and pollution prevention. Id. at 1070–71. 
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in the Arctic Council. These various layers impact almost every aspect of 
Arctic life, work, politics, and law.82 
A. The Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council began in 1996 as a forum for Arctic countries to 
discuss environmental issues.83 As a successor to the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy, it has become a major regional club, especially over 
the last six years. There are eight members: Canada, Russia, Denmark 
(through Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the United 
States.84 As of 2012, there are also six “Permanent Participants” 
 
 
 82. Significantly, however, the Arctic Council is currently prohibited from discussing security 
and military affairs. See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 1387, 1388 n.1 (“The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”) 
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration]. Some analysts think that there should be a change to the long-
standing policy of the Arctic Council to not discuss security issues, because there is already a marked 
increase in military activity in the Arctic. See Robert Huebert, Arctic Security, CENTRE FOR MILITARY 
AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/arcticsecurity (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013). Although the Arctic is generally a region marked by productive cooperation 
between stakeholders, the possibility exists that current military buildups could lead to strained 
relations in the event of accidents or flare-ups in disputes over territory. James Astill, Too Much To 
Fight Over, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21556797. This is 
especially important due to the unique relationship that many of these countries have with their Arctic 
regions. When this is combined with the large amount of money and resources at stake in the Arctic, 
the case for cooperative and transparent discussions of security and military issues becomes even more 
compelling. Id. 
 83. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1627. This Strategy, 
adopted in 1991, grew out of “recognition that many of the environmental problems that individual 
nations had been addressing, were in fact shared amongst the eight [Arctic nations].” Id. at 1633.  Six 
environmental issues were mentioned: “persistent organic contaminants, oil, heavy metals, noise, 
radioactivity, and acidification.” Id. at 1634. Initial measures included the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Program (AMAP) for “measurement of the levels of anthropogenic pollutants and the 
assessment of their effects in all relevant component parts of the Arctic environment.” Id. at 1656. The 
implementation of the Strategy was to be “carried out through national legislation and in accordance 
with international law,” including UNCLOS. Id. at 1630.  The Strategy called for regular meetings to 
monitor progress and continue cooperation. Id. at 1668. 
 84. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 82. The Joint Communique declared:  
 The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to:  
 (a) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the 
Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic.  
 (b) oversee and coordinate the programs established . . . . 
 (c) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development 
program.  
 (d) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related 
issues. 
Id. at 1388.  
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representing constituencies that are made up of a majority of indigenous 
peoples.85 
The Arctic Council is a project-driven institution that has specific 
mandates in environmental study and the promulgation of uniform 
principles, guidelines, and best practices for Arctic exploration and 
development. The forum has recently begun attracting high ranking 
government officials to its meetings, including former United States 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. The Council is also putting 
down permanent institutions as a precursor to more effective management 
of the geopolitical, environmental, and economic risks and rewards. On 
January 21, 2013, the Council set up its first permanent secretariat in 
Tromso, Norway.86  
The Council is coming into its own in other ways. Although originally 
conceived of as a forum for cooperation and discussion, binding law is 
now coming into force for the first time in areas such as search and rescue 
in the Arctic and oil spill cleanups.87 The increasing strategic importance 
 
 
 85. These are the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); Aleut International Association (AIA); 
Gwich’in Council International (GCI); Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON); and Saami Council (SC). Permanent Participants, 
ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanentparticipants (last 
visited, Jan. 25, 2013).  The “category is open equally to Arctic organizations of Indigenous peoples 
with a majority of Arctic Indigenous constituency representing: a single Indigenous people resident in 
more than one Arctic State; or more than one Arctic Indigenous people resident in a single Arctic 
State.” Id. The Permanent Participants also have their own “Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.” Id. 
Further, twelve non-Arctic countries have been admitted as Permanent Observer States to the Arctic 
Council: France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, the People’s 
Republic of China, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and India. Observers, ARCTIC 
COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013).  Nine Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations have been given 
observer status, as have eleven Non-Governmental Organizations. Id. 
 86. Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47. The new standing Secretariat of the Arctic Council 
will be located in Tromso, Norway. Magnus Johannesson will be its first Director. Press Release, 
Arctic Council, Introduction to the Director of the Arctic Council Secretariat (Nov. 23, 2012) 
(available at www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/general-news-archive/647-introduction-to-
the-director-of-the-arctic-council-secretariat). Mr. Johannesson is currently the Secretary General for 
the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources in Iceland. Id. The hope is that the Secretariat 
will “enhance the work of the Arctic Council through the establishment of administrative capacity and 
by providing continuity, institutional memory, operational efficiency, enhanced communication and 
outreach, exchange of information with other relevant international organizations and to support 
activities of the Arctic Council.” Arctic Council, Terms of Reference of the Arctic Council Secretariat, 
at 1, AC Doc. DMM02 (May 15, 2012).  
 87. The Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic, May 12, 2011, Canada Treaty Series 2013/6, available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/ 
details.aspx?id=105240, is the first legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council. See Past Task Forces, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.arctic-council 
.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces/811-past-task-forces. The task force given the 
mission of negotiating the terms of the agreement was co-chaired by Russian and American 
representatives. Id. It “defines an area of the Arctic in which [each of the parties to the agreement] will 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:155 
 
 
 
 
of the Arctic in economic, environmental, and geopolitical terms is 
demonstrated by the massive increase in attention paid to the Arctic 
Council by non-Arctic entities.88 Countries as diverse as Singapore, China, 
Italy, and India have already submitted applications to be admitted under 
“Observer Status.”89 Other entities such as the European Union, 
Greenpeace, and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
have also applied for such status.90 
B. Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements 
The next major category of regulatory and governance framework in 
the Arctic includes multilateral and bilateral agreements, conventions, and 
treaties. The first of these is The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Seas (UNCLOS),91 which establishes the global framework of rights 
and responsibilities on the world’s oceans; it applies with full force in the 
Arctic Ocean.92 UNCLOS is used in various contexts to address ongoing 
issues in the Arctic. For instance, it deals with ongoing territorial 
disputes.93 UNCLOS also includes provisions to deal with environmental 
pollution concerns, such as Article 234, which gives coastal states the right 
to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the 
prevention of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas of their 
exclusive economic zone.94 The International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution From Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 
 
 
have lead responsibility in organizing responses to search and rescue incidents.” Id. The Agreement 
“also commits Parties to provide appropriate assistance in the event of such an incident and to take 
other steps [to] address growing search and rescue needs in the Arctic region.” Id. In October 2011, 
Canada organized the first exercises among search and rescue agencies of the Arctic Council Members 
as a first step toward implementation of the Agreement. Id. The push behind the search and rescue 
agreements is primarily driven by the fact that such operations are too difficult and “expensive for 
countries to undertake on their own.” Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47. The binding agreement on 
oil spill cleanups is the second such binding treaty. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. UNCLOS, supra note 81.  
 92. Schofield, supra note 13, at 44 (noting that the four littoral Arctic countries apart from the 
United States have ratified the treaty, but that the United States considers the treaty to be customary 
international law).  
 93. There are several disputed boundaries between the Arctic nations. Particularly important are 
conflicting claims to the Lomonosov ridge. Russia, Canada, and Denmark all lay claim to this 
important geological feature. Astill, supra note 82. 
 94. Under UNCLOS, the Exclusive Economic Zone of a coastal state (EEZ) is that which 
extends up to 200 nautical miles from their shore. UNCLOS, supra note 81, art. 234. 
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(MARPOL 73/78), are other examples of such regimes that function 
within specific subject areas.95  
Governance mechanisms at bilateral and international levels differ 
markedly from the regional level governance of the Arctic Council. First, 
the various multilateral agreements listed above are binding law to those 
countries who have signed. Second, the agreements are not specifically 
designed for the Arctic region, taking into account the unique needs of the 
Arctic context. One criticism leveled against UNCLOS as a method of 
regulating in the Arctic is the fact that its scope is worldwide, not 
specifically focused on the regulatory and governance needs of the 
Arctic.96 Because of this fact, some of the multilateral deficit is filled with 
various efforts through the International Maritime Organization (IMO); for 
instance, the IMO is in the process of drafting a mandatory Polar Code for 
publication in the near future.97   
C. National Jurisdictions 
The Arctic region has particular importance at the domestic level of the 
Arctic countries, often going beyond economic concerns into national 
myths.98 Russia, for instance, has seen the Arctic as a “source of . . . pride 
in the feats of their explorers, scientists and engineers” for over a hundred 
years.99 Canada has been increasingly vocal about its security interests in 
 
 
 95. Importantly, shipping in the Arctic is currently highly regulated. At least four international 
treaties apply. Anderson, supra note 5, at 69. There are four principal IMO instruments which contain 
provisions applicable to commercial polar shipping, including the International Convention on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278, the Protocol of 1978 Relating 
to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL), Feb. 17, 
1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), July 7, 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 190, and the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 119.  
Anderson, supra note 5, at 69. These conventions include special provisions that may apply to ships 
operating in Polar Waters but are independent and not specifically drafted for either the ice conditions 
or the fragile environment of the Polar Regions. Id. 
 96. Some argue that UNCLOS has gaps in its authority and scope. Jeffers, supra note 35, at 958. 
Another recognition of the shortcomings of the Law of the Seas as a comprehensive governance 
framework is that it applies to states, and may not necessarily include within its concerns those of 
Arctic peoples unaffiliated with a particular state. Nordic Report, supra note 7, at 61. 
 97. Anderson, supra note 5, at 60. See also IMO, UPDATE ON WORK TO DEVELOP THE POLAR 
CODE (2011), available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/polarcode 
PPT2011.pdf. The Polar Code mostly makes mandatory various provisions under MARPOL or 
SOLAS that have been recommended since their proposal in 2009. 
 98. Astill, supra note 82. 
 99. Id. 
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the region.100 In the United States, the strategic importance of the Arctic 
region is explicitly acknowledged by American law.101  
The above suggests that governance at the national level is important to 
the overall scheme of Arctic governance. In the United States, Arctic 
affairs are managed by several different agencies, although coordination is 
increasingly centralized because of the increasing importance of the region 
to U.S. interests.102 In the other Arctic nations, Arctic policy is coordinated 
at different levels.103  
One important aspect of national-level legislation is that under national 
law in most Arctic countries, an environmental impact assessment must be 
made prior to development, and a number of factors must be included 
when making that assessment.104 These include inquiries into whether an 
ecosystem will be disturbed through construction of pipelines and roads, 
 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. American policy toward the Arctic region is contained in Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 
2008 PUB. PAPERS 1545 (Jan. 9, 2009). This order demonstrates the importance of the Arctic to 
American foreign policy. It was laid out in the waning days of the Bush Administration. Id. The policy 
stance of the Obama administration is largely a continuation of that under Bush. On May 10, 2013, the 
President issued a National Strategy Document for the Arctic Region that delineates his 
Administration’s official Arctic policy in strategic terms. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. This document has many guiding principles that are compatible with 
the goals that this Note argues should inform Arctic governance going forward. For instance, “we will 
be guided by our central interests in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security of the 
United States; protecting the free flow of resources and commerce; protecting the environment; 
addressing the needs of indigenous communities; and enabling scientific research.” Id. at 4. Other 
important Executive Branch materials relevant to American governance in the Arctic include: Exec. 
Order No. 12501, 50 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 28, 1985) (“Arctic Research”); Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 
Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010) (“Stewardship of the Oceans, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes”); 
Exec. Order No. 13580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,989 (July 12, 2011) (“Interagency Working Group on 
Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska”); and Exec. Order No. 
13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (“Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments”). Congressional statements of American policy toward the Arctic may be found in the 
Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4101 (2013).  
 102. The Arctic Policy Group, which is an interagency task force devoted to developing American 
policy in the Arctic, is chaired by Secretary of State John Kerry.  This group controls U.S. interaction 
with the Arctic Council as well. HEATHER A. CONLEY ET AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY FRONTIER: U.S. INTERESTS AND ACTORS IN THE 
REGION 2 (2013), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Conley_NewForeignPol 
Frontier_Web_0.pdf. Other important entities include the Interagency Arctic Research Policy 
Committee, the Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic, and the National Ocean Council; at least 
20 agencies are involved in the Arctic. Id.   
 103. In Canada, for example, authority over Arctic matters is split between federal control over 
issues of defense and international relations, and devolved power to provincial governments in matters 
such as health and education. See CANADIAN MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS & NORTHERN 
DEVELOPMENT, CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR FUTURE 
(2009), available at http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf.  
 104. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 38. 
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the level of noise pollution from offshore drilling, a seismic survey 
activity, the possibility of additional maritime traffic, and whether there 
will be physical disturbance of the sea and seabed during drilling or 
through the break-up of sea ice.105 
III. THE GOALS OF A NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
Any new governance mechanisms or improvements upon existing 
governance institutions must be based upon goals that are broadly 
supported and clearly articulated. These goals should maintain the Arctic 
as a model of productive multinational cooperation.106 Further, the goals of 
future governance mechanisms may be informed by past examples of 
successful international agreements, such as those in the Antarctic.107 
As applied to the Arctic, the goals that this Note proposes are: 
economic development, environmental stewardship, political stability, and 
social cohesion.108 These goals are interrelated, and can be synergistic. 
For example, economic development that will continue to bring wealth 
and progress to the Arctic is needed, and the potential to connect remote 
areas of the world to the benefits of a globalizing world are obvious.109 At 
the same time that Arctic energy production will benefit the region’s 
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Arctic interaction is indeed so characterized presently. Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47 
(“The Arctic Council epitomizes this spirit of increasing cooperation.”).  
 107. Indeed, some believe the Antarctic Treaty could be useful in the Arctic context. See Erika 
Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal Regimes in the Arctic and the 
Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32 (Spring 2008). Such proponents say that it “provides 
protective laws with binding force to guard the Antarctic’s environment and addresses issues common 
to both poles: research, national security concerns, sovereignty interest, and the environment.” See 
Malloy, supra note 79, at 495. But significant differences between that scenario and the Arctic context 
make direct parallels impractical. The Antarctic encompasses no land within the sovereign jurisdiction 
of any country. Lennon, supra, at 35. It is isolated, and significantly less accessible for development 
purposes. There are fewer and less important strategic concerns for countries because of its remote 
location. Id. Imposition, wholesale, of an Antarctic-type, mandatory regime to blanket the entirety of 
the geographical area and development issues is impracticable and undesirable. Id at 36. 
 108. These are broad terms but, at this stage, necessarily so. The goals must be broad enough to 
attract widespread support and legitimacy, and also flexible enough when it comes to negotiating the 
specifics of their implementation. It is expected that negotiations can produce more specific, 
quantifiable, and attainable goals for the near term and long term. 
 109. The potential for bringing greater wealth to the region through economic development is 
demonstrated by the fact that “[i]n resource rich Arctic regions of the United States, Canada, and 
Russia the Gross regional product (GRP) per capita is considerably higher than in non-Arctic regions.” 
THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH 2008 30 (Solveig Glomsrød et al., Statistics Norway eds., 2009). 
Indeed, in Russia, the petroleum industries have led to GRP per capita of as much as three times higher 
than the non-Arctic Regions: $29,000 to $9,000, respectively. Id. at 24. 
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economy, however, it is crucial that this occur in a way that is sensitive to 
an extremely fragile ecosystem.110  
The Arctic is a delicate ecosystem that requires comprehensive 
planning, risk management, and forward thinking.111 Therefore, 
environmental stewardship must be an essential and overarching goal of 
Arctic governance because otherwise many of the economic benefits of 
development may be undermined as political risk increases in the face of 
public backlash.112   
Good governance should also focus on social goals such as giving all 
segments of Arctic societies the opportunity to participate in wealth-
building activities, effectively including the voices of disparate groups, 
and increasing overall social cohesion.113 This is important because 
economic development necessarily involves change and some level of 
social dislocation.114 Thus there must be a conscious effort to keep more of 
the revenue from development in the area, with some of the money spent 
on social causes such as improving access and quality of health care, 
education, and job training.115 
Finally, all of these goals require political stability. During the Cold 
War, the Arctic region bristled with military activity and was considered 
the front line in the West’s defenses against militaristic communism.116 
That scenario stands in stark contrast to today, where the Arctic is a region 
of relative peace and productive cooperation.117 Political stability will 
 
 
 110. A leading Canadian newspaper has stated it this way: “Development will bring benefits to the 
people who live there, and help them achieve economic self-sufficiency. However, due regard must be 
given to conservation of the Arctic environment. . . . Even a minor oil spill could have major 
environmental consequences.” See Editorial, Arctic Oil: Much Promise, But to Be Handled with Care, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 10, 2013) available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/ 
editorials/arctic-oil-much-promise-but-to-be-handled-with-care/article8395621/.  
 111. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 53.  
 112. Id. at 46. In fact, at least one major oil company, Total SA, has concluded that the risk of an 
oil spill in the area was “simply too high” and that such an event would “do too much damage to the 
image of the company.” Guy Chazan, Total Warns Against Oil Drilling in Arctic, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 
25, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/350be724-070a-11e2-92ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2LA 
qebEwa. They will not drill for crude oil in Arctic waters. Id. 
 113. The Arctic Council’s inclusion of numerous indigenous representatives, discussed supra Part 
II.A, is a good example of this principle.  
 114. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of recent social dislocation in the Arctic region. 
 115. See infra Part IV for specific proposals. 
 116. Smith, supra note 6. 
 117. Haakon Druun Hanssen, a Norwegian Admiral, has gone so far as to say that the Arctic is 
“probably the most stable area in the world.” Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47. The Arctic is 
probably the one area where Russia interacts most productively with the Western world. Whereas 
stand-offs over Syria and Iran have pitted Western nations in opposition to Russia diplomatically and 
at the U.N. Security Council, Russia’s interactions with the United States in particular have been 
cordial and warm in the Arctic. Astill, supra note 82. At a recent conference in Singapore organized by 
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allow for economic growth, cooperation regarding environmental 
challenges, and collaborative interaction between indigenous groups and 
Arctic governments.118 Thus, a proposed governance framework must 
have geopolitical stability as one of its goals. 
IV. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE CURRENT GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK 
Improvements in the current framework are possible at every level of 
Arctic governance.119 At the pan-Arctic level, the Arctic Council should 
lay more permanent and substantial institutional foundations. Expanding 
the purview of the permanent secretariat will help.120 The secretariat 
functions as the executive power within the organization, giving it 
direction and accountability in the implementation of the policies 
negotiated by the Council’s member states. A more powerful secretariat 
can facilitate those negotiations and forge ahead with implementation in 
the aftermath. The Council should also expand the scope of binding law 
issued under its authority.121 Finally, continuing to attract higher-ranking 
representatives from Arctic nations will continue to help.122  
 
 
The Economist, Russia’s ambassador for Arctic affairs, Anton Vasiliev said that “[t]he Arctic is a bit 
special for civility . . . . You cannot survive alone in the Arctic: this is perhaps true for countries as 
well as individuals.” Id.  
 118. Most believe this will indeed be the case, because of the overwhelming incentive for Arctic 
countries to concentrate on developing the resources they have, as opposed to political battles over 
contested locations. Id. 
 119. Indeed, comprehensive attention to all levels of governance in the Arctic is required for 
effective pursuit of the goals laid out because of the unique nature of the Arctic. “A long-term and 
comprehensive regulatory approach—incorporating national governments, bodies such as the Arctic 
Council, and industry bodies—is necessary for effective risk management, mandating cross-Arctic best 
practices and defining public policy priorities on what constitutes appropriate development.” 
EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 9. This is because even “more acutely than elsewhere in the world, 
economic development and environmental sustainability in the Arctic are co-dependent.” Id.  
 The reason for the multi-layered approach is that “the Arctic is not—nor is it likely to become—a 
truly single regulatory space.” Id. To a large extent, “Arctic states and other interested parties are 
increasingly forging common approaches to shared challenges” but sovereignty ultimately lies in 
multiple areas. Id. 
 120. See supra note 86 for a description of the current responsibilities, setup, and goals of the new 
Secretariat. 
 121. The Arctic Council should continue to strengthen its governance role by issuing legally 
binding obligations on its members. The benefits of regionally concentrating on the Arctic, combined 
with the widespread participation of various Arctic stakeholders, makes the Arctic Council the 
appropriate body for promulgating legally binding Arctic rules. One example of a promising binding 
agreements from the Arctic Council relates to Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response. 
Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47.  
 122. In addition to Hillary Clinton, Ken Salazar, then Secretary of the Interior, and Senator Lisa 
Murkowski (Republican from Alaska) attended the Nuuk meeting. Arctic Council, Nuuk Declaration 
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The Arctic Council should also increase the number of observer-status 
entities. China and Singapore, for example, have already applied for 
admission123 and should be admitted.124 Other nations, particularly those 
involved in natural resource development, should have a seat at the table 
and be required to operate within the agreements forged at this level.125 As 
shipping increases in the Arctic Region, major players in that industry 
should operate within the purview of agreements reached at an Arctic-
wide level.126 
Inclusion of more entities within the Arctic Council is also important 
because of the unique role that global climate change plays in the Arctic 
and the unique impact that Arctic environmental changes have in a global 
context.127 As changes in the Arctic environment affect the global 
environment, the world should have a more direct say in what happens in 
the Arctic.128 Such inclusion would have two main benefits. First, the 
expertise of outside entities can contribute to productive responses to 
environmental challenges. Second, a more widespread consensus on 
activities and governance in the Arctic will serve to increase the 
legitimacy of actions taken in the Arctic. Thus the membership of the 
Arctic Council should be expanded.129 
In addition to expanding the membership of the Arctic Council, 
constituent countries should enhance the ability of the Council to issue 
binding law. One proposal that the Arctic Council should make is to call 
upon its members to institute an appropriate price on carbon emissions, 
through a tax or market based system.130 This system would persuade 
 
 
at 10 (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/5-declarations?download=259:nuuk-declaration-2011.  
 123. Outsiders in the Arctic, supra note 47.  
 124. China should be admitted because of its size and importance in world affairs. Singapore 
should be admitted because it has important interests at stake, including its status as a global shipping 
nation and because it is an island nation particularly vulnerable to rises in global sea levels as a result 
of climate change. 
 125. For instance, China is becoming a massive investor in Greenland. Outsiders in the Arctic, 
supra note 47. If recent proposed investments are approved in Denmark, 5,000 Chinese workers could 
be coming to Nuuk, its capital. Id. The current population of Nuuk is only 15,000. Id. 
 126. Singapore, for instance, is interested in joining because the increase in Arctic shipping 
directly threatens its status as a global shipping hub. Id. 
 127. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 128. Crump, supra note 7. 
 129. Of course, as an institution becomes more widely representative more parties are included, 
and therefore the institution is subject to a corresponding decrease in effectiveness of action. 
Hopefully, this problem can, to some extent, be dealt with by increasing the power and purview of the 
Arctic Council’s secretariat. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 130. Actually, this policy would also be appropriate for worldwide implementation. But the 
politics of a global carbon tax are complex, and the chances of such a tax are not good. Therefore, it 
makes sense for the Arctic Council to push forward with such a scheme, because they have arguably 
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polluters to develop and adopt cleaner technologies, which would then be 
more competitive, thus furthering the goal of economic development and 
environmental stewardship.131  
Robust bilateral and multilateral governance mechanisms are also vital 
to improved Arctic governance. Such agreements can take account of 
specific areas of governance, such as littoral and shipping concerns. 
Governance at this level can deal with one of the major problems with 
shipping in the Arctic: pollution and liability regimes. “The current 
international system for compensation for pollution damage caused by 
ship-source pollution is fragmented and limited.”132   
A similar multilateral agreement for the resource development 
industries is needed. The unique nature of the Arctic environment means 
that the development of these resources needs to take place in an orderly 
and managed way with incentives for excellent safety. Thus a desirable 
treaty might include requiring companies operating in the Arctic to post a 
bond where they are operating. Such a scheme exists in Greenland, where 
companies must either post a $2 billion bond, or have $10 billion in equity 
to qualify for exploration licenses.133 In addition to this bond, which 
should be posted during licensing, transparent worst-case scenario plans 
should be required.134 Although this prescription could be implemented at 
the national level, it may make sense to impose the requirement on all 
Arctic countries to avoid economically distorting disparities and 
incentives.  
Thus pan-Arctic and multilateral governance mechanisms are 
important and needed institutions in the Arctic. But it must be remembered 
that in many respects, current law is still focused primarily on the 
 
 
the most at stake in reducing worldwide carbon emissions. James Astill, Cold Comfort, ECONOMIST 
(June 16, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21556805. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Anderson, supra note 5, at 73–74 (citing ARTIC COUNCIL, ARTIC MARINE SHIPPING 
ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 65). It should be further recognized that each Arctic state has its own 
system of assessing compensation for environmental damage; conversely, there is a single, unified 
system for the Antarctic. This should change. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 133. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 41. This should be enforced at the licensing stage so 
governments can assure themselves that companies have the financial resources to clean up any mess.  
 134. Activities related to oil and gas in the Arctic Ocean must be prudent. This would require high 
environmental standards adapted to the sensitivity of the Arctic, including ecosystem based 
management; rigorous environmental and strategic impact assessment; effective prevention, 
preparedness, and response to accidents, including clean-up of pollution incidents; and advanced 
monitoring and research. See Editorial, Arctic Oil, supra note 109. The story of Royal Dutch Shell is a 
telling example of the high environmental stakes in the Arctic. One of the most technologically 
advanced companies operating in the Arctic north, Shell has run simulations of the interactions of ice 
and oil in the event of a spill, in preparation for future contingencies. Astill, supra note 45. The results 
were not at all encouraging. Id. 
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individual sovereignty of the nations in the region.135 Regulatory agencies 
within each country should operate transparently and work to harmonize 
their rules and regulations, or at least pursue rules that are compatible. One 
example of an area for harmonization is domestic liability regimes.136 
Currently, caps on economic damages are too low, functioning as a risk 
transfer to the public sector to encourage investment.137 These caps should 
be lifted, in order to promote heightened attention to safety concerns in the 
Arctic environment, and unified, to prevent jurisdiction hopping. 
Finally, institutionalizing modes of communications between 
respective regulatory agencies would do a good deal to ensure that these 
bodies are not acting at cross-purposes, and that best practices are 
disseminated and followed.138  
CONCLUSION 
The Arctic region is changing rapidly. It is changing in ways that are 
both positive and challenging—environmentally, economically, and 
socially. In order to tackle the issues currently confronting the Arctic, 
governance recommendations like those stated herein should be 
implemented. Based on the goals of environmental protection, economic 
growth, widespread participation, and social cohesion, these 
recommendations recognize the important role that governance 
mechanisms can play in forging a prosperous and clean Arctic.  
Of course, the topic of Arctic governance is a complex and detailed 
one. The ideas in this Note will hopefully serve as a useful foundation for 
further discussions of this pressing topic of worldwide concern. 
Michael T. Geiselhart∗ 
 
 
 135. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 34. 
 136. The biggest divide in liability regimes is between so-called liability (with fault) and “absolute 
liability” (no fault). Canada limits absolute liability to $30 million, the United States to $75 million, 
and the United Kingdom to $250 million. At-fault accidents are limited to economic loss and clean-up 
costs. Paul McLeod, Oil Spill Protection Called Good, CHRON. HERALD (Feb. 7, 2013), http://the 
chronicleherald.ca/novascotia/661471-oil-spill-protection-called-good.  Liability should be harmonized 
as much as possible to eliminate misaligned incentives to locate operations in certain jurisdictions. 
 137. EMERSON & LAHN, supra note 3, at 41. 
 138. To some extent, this already happens at the Arctic Council. It should happen via direct 
communications between relevant authorities in respective countries.  
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